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Abstract
This article presents the concept of a “crowning moment” and proposes an explanation for 
the media-savviness of many populist leaders – an under-theorised ability often referred to 
in existing research. A crowning moment is an instance in which populist leaders take advan-
tage of opportunities that arise in their surroundings to achieve a or multiple major policy, 
political and/or personal goals through skilful use of the media that earns them recognition 
as savvy politicians. The concept is exemplified through an analysis of Norwegian Progress 
Party leader Carl I. Hagen’s role in the 1987 no-confidence motion against the Labour Party 
government. Stoking up and exploiting media interest in dramatic fashion, Hagen managed 
to redefine himself as a national political leader and made his party appear responsible. 
Keywords: crowning moment, populist use of the media, Carl I. Hagen, populism, strategi-
cal media use
Introduction
Existing research finds, first, that the media facilitate populism, as there is overlap be-
tween populist communication and media production styles (e.g. tabloidisation) (Blumler 
& Kavanagh, 1999; Esser et al., 2017; Mazzoleni, 2008, 2014; Manucci, 2017; Mudde, 
2004). Second, the media-savviness of populist leaders such as Jörg Haider, Carl I. 
Hagen, Geert Wilders, Silvio Berlusconi, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage and Donald 
Trump is frequently cited as a key factor in their political rise, even though this ability 
has not been much theorised (Boczkowski & Papacharissi, 2018; Esser et al., 2017; 
Manucci, 2017; Mazzoleni, 2008, 2014). 
This article adds to the first finding by developing the concept of a “crowning mo-
ment”. The concept denotes an instance in which populists take advantage of opportu-
nities that arise in their surroundings to achieve one or multiple policy, political and/or 
personal goal(s) through skilful use of the media that earns them recognition as savvy 
politicians. Previously regarded primarily as outsiders, they are, after the “crowning”, 
seen as something of a mastermind of the political game, with a capacity for strategising 
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and manoeuvring that is exemplary in terms of pure political skill. Even if they are still 
outsiders ideologically and rhetorically, they have become insiders in terms of excel-
ling at the political game. The article adds to the second finding – the media-savviness 
of many populist leaders – by proposing that populism is inherently likely to produce 
leaders willing and able to leverage the media for their own benefit. 
The concept of a crowning moment is similar to the concepts of “critical junctures” 
and “political opportunity structures” in political science and political sociology in its 
focus on favourable circumstances creating opportunities for change (for overviews, 
see Capoccia, 2016 and Giugni, 2009). However, while these general concepts tend 
to focus on the development of institutions and collective actors such as social move-
ments, the concept of a crowning moment is more specific in that it is only concerned 
with the transformative effects of individual populists’ use of the media, for that specific 
individual, within a favourable context.
The Progress Party is the oldest successful right-wing populist party in the Nordic 
region (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Jupskås, 2015), and given (former) party leader Carl I. 
Hagen’s dominant position within the party – for three decades, the public image of the 
party was closely linked to that of Hagen – the party, Hagen himself, and the episode 
are representative of West-European populist radical right parties and their reliance on 
charismatic, media-savvy leaders (see Mazzoleni, 2008, 2014). It is thus an appropriate 
case for developing a concept that can guide future studies of the rise of other populist 
leaders, and it effectively shows how a crowning moment can play out. During the 1987 
no-confidence motion against the Labour Party government, Hagen skilfully executed 
his media-centred plan so that the week-long drama, which kept the country in suspense, 
played to his advantage. By successfully framing the issue at hand – a conflict between 
the government and the farmers – as a matter of fiscal responsibility, Hagen’s party 
earned some much-needed credibility as a serious and responsible actor, with Hagen 
himself winning much praise for his gambit, thus elevating him personally, too.
Next, I review previous theories on populism and the media. After a methodological 
note, I define and explain the concept of a crowning moment and apply it to the case of 
Hagen. The conclusion discusses the implications of the study. 
Theory review: populism and the mediatization of politics
The study of populism through the media encompasses two separate strands of research: 
populism as a concept, and the ways in which it connects to the media. Although pop-
ulism can be conceptualised “as an ideology, as a discursive style, and a form of politi-
cal mobilization” (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013: 5; see also Canovan, 1999; Zaslove, 
2008), most of the existing literature treats populism as either an ideology or as a style 
of communication. There is general agreement that the privileging and extolling of “the 
people” and anti-elitism are the core attributes, with the exclusion of various out-groups, 
especially immigrants, as an additional defining characteristic. For example, in Mudde’s 
(2004: 543) influential definition, populism is “an ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ 
versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
volonté générale (general will) of the people”. Jagers and Walgrave (2007: 322), on the 
other hand, consider populism to be a political communication style that “refers to the 
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people, vents anti-establishment ideas and simultaneously excludes certain population 
categories”. 
Regarding the links between populism and the media, Mazzoleni (2014: 49), who 
argues that (political) “populism is largely a communicative phenomenon”, stresses that 
it “is strongly correlated with media populism (with its popular and ideological basis)”. 
There are multiple approaches to studying the relationship between populism and the 
media, ranging from the mediatization of politics, populism by the media themselves, 
populism through online communication, populist citizen journalism to considerations of 
the possible deleterious effects of populism broadcasted by the media on democracy (Es-
ser et al., 2017; Manucci, 2017; Mazzoleni, 2014). This article focuses on the mediatiza-
tion of politics and populism, or what Esser and colleagues (2017: 4)1  refer to as “pop-
ulism through the media”. The mediatization of politics is a subtopic of the much wider 
concept of mediatization, which “refers to a social change process in which media have 
become increasingly influential in and deeply integrated into different spheres of society” 
(Strömbäck & Esser, 2014: 3; see also Asp, 1986; Hjarvard, 2008; Lundby, 2009).2 Asp 
(1986: 359) defines it as a process where “a political system to a high degree is influ-
enced by and adjusted to the demands of the mass media in their coverage of politics”. 
 The media’s influence on politics, in particular campaigning, has also received con-
siderable attention in political science and party studies (see Farrell, 2006; Semetko, 
2006). The arrival of television and public opinion polls in the 1950s signalled the start 
of “parties in the media age” (Semetko, 2006: 515), in which parties communicate with 
voters primarily through the mass media. Wiesendahl (2009: 38) characterises the orien-
tation towards television as a “Copernican turn” in modern campaigning, which in turn 
has become a permanent feature of politics (Blumenthal, 1982). Strömbäck and Esser 
(2014: 15), who conceive of four dimensions of the overall concept, the mediatization 
of politics (the media as information source; media autonomy; media practices; political 
practices), also note that mediatization can be expected to impact the public partisan-
political process in particular, which is about “the processes of garnering support for 
one’s candidacy, party or political programme”. They stress, however, that “mediatiza-
tion is not a linear and unidirectional process with a uniform influence across political 
actors and institutions within or across countries” (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014: 20).
It is this arena that populists may be particularly suited to compete in. In what 
Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) describe as the “third age of political communication”, 
marketisation and tabloidisation have made infotainment, politainment, sensationalism, 
superficiality and personalisation defining features of contemporary mass media. Char-
ismatic, flamboyant, media-savvy populists, with their simple and polarising rhetoric, 
thrive in this environment (Manucci, 2017; Mazzoleni, 2008, 2014). According to Esser 
and colleagues (2017: 4-5), a stylistic “congruence between media logic and political 
populism” means that the media easily accommodate populist discourse, as “[c]haris-
matic leaders, harsh rhetoric, and stirring issues hit all the right keys of newsworthiness”. 
Their amplification of the populist message amounts to “media complicity”, according to 
Mazzoleni (2008: 50), meaning that “[w]hen the media report on these actors’ slogans, 
arguments, and ideological perspectives, they heighten their public visibility and per-
ceived legitimacy” (Esser et al., 2017: 4). Thus, the media are one of several “external 
supply-side” factors that constitute the “political opportunity structures” within which 




The purpose of this analysis is to develop the concept of a crowning moment semanti-
cally; the article primarily defines it (see Collier & Mahon, 1993; Goertz, 2006; Sartori, 
1970). I derived the concept during an inductive analysis of events surrounding the 
1987 no-confidence motion against the Norwegian government, and Carl I. Hagen’s 
role in it. My approach is similar to Thomas’ (2006: 238) use of inductive analysis, 
which he defines as “approaches that primarily use detailed readings of raw data to 
derive concepts, themes, or a model through interpretations made from the raw data 
by an evaluator or researcher”. The material used was, first, three books and an op-ed 
which detail the course of events (Hagen’s own 2007 biography; an unauthorised 2006 
biography about Hagen by journalist Elisabeth Skarsbø Moen; the [authorised] 1998 
biography of the Progress Party’s first 25 years; a 2014 op-ed by social scientist Hilmar 
Rommetvedt) and, second, a set of newspaper articles mostly covering Hagen’s TV 
appearance on 11 June. 
Crowning moments: transformative populist use of the media 
The mediatization of politics is a general trend that affects political actors and institu-
tions in Western societies to varying degrees, and we should therefore expect consid-
erable empirical variation with respect to different cases. Political parties, including 
populist actors, operate within various and varying constraints that affect what they can 
and will do. Accounting for and assessing the effects of this interplay between various 
external and internal supply-side factors, with respect to the opportunities they create 
for populists, is beyond the scope of this article. The point of departure here is the as-
sumption that within any type of political setting, a perceptive and savvy populist will 
recognise favourable circumstances when they are present and make the most of them 
to achieve his/her goal. 
My concern here is with occasions when populist leaders use the media in a trans-
formative way that I characterise as a “crowning moment”. The concept denotes an 
instance in which populists take advantage of opportunities that arise in their surround-
ings to achieve one or multiple major policy, political and/or personal goal(s) through 
skilful use of the media that earns them recognition as savvy politicians. In proposing 
this concept, I have drawn inspiration from three distinct scholarly literatures, two of 
which are partially related. First, within the American presidency literature, George 
Edwards’ thesis of presidential leadership holds that presidents’ ability to lead is highly 
constraint-sensitive and context-dependent: 
(…) successful presidents facilitate change by recognizing opportunities in their 
environments and fashioning strategies and tactics to exploit them. In other words, 
presidents who are successful in obtaining support for their agendas have to evalu-
ate the opportunities for change in their environments carefully and orchestrate 
existing and potential support skilfully. (Edwards, 2012: 2)
The proposition that a favourable configuration of environmental forces can create a 
window of opportunity for some actor to accomplish some or multiple goals can be 
applied to a variety of settings, as it merely highlights the potential for action when 
political opportunity is matched by political skill.
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Second, Strömbäck and Esser’s (2014) conceptualisation of the mediatization of 
politics explains why the media may be a major facilitator when the right political op-
portunity presents itself. Specifically, the media, which are the most important informa-
tion source for the public, and because they are independent, have their own standards 
for newsworthiness that attention-seeking political actors and institutions adapt to. The 
media-savvy populist can thus cater to the media’s appetite for conflict and drama and 
leverage media coverage to achieve some specific goal. Moreover, the media can confer 
authority upon someone through their coverage (Herbst, 2003).
Third, Pedersen’s theory of party lifespans (1982) and Mazzoleni’s (2008) three 
phases of populist-media relations imply that parties have different priorities at different 
points in time, and that the potential for “partnering” with the media may be greatest in 
“the insurgent phase”, when the populists “stage controversial events, engage in verbal 
extremism and fiercely attack government policies (for example, on immigration, taxes 
and social welfare)” (Mazzoleni, 2008: 60). 
The idea of a crowning moment suggests that politics is not awash with opportunities 
for a breakout moment. Populists, including those who excel at attracting media atten-
tion, must usually invest considerable time and effort in conventional, unspectacular 
partisan-political activities, such as organisation-building, in order to have long-term 
influence on public policy, lest they disappear again after an initial electoral break-
through (Harmel et al., 2018; Mudde, 2007). While these long-term and time-consuming 
undertakings are a tall order for any party leader, they are particularly challenging for 
populists. Populism is anti-establishment – a protest against the political, economic 
and cultural elites. Furthermore, it is a “thin ideology” (Freeden, 1998; Mudde, 2004) 
that eschews detail-rich policy programmes in favour of sweeping, often slogan-driven 
policy solutions centring on the populist leader’s supposedly exceptional leadership 
abilities. Populists are also often very sceptical of party organisations and prefer unme-
diated decision-making by a strong leader. Mogens Glistrup, for example, opposed a 
party organisation because he did not want to be bothered with it, while Anders Lange 
saw party organisations as the mode of establishment politics (Harmel et al., 2018). 
Populists’ conflict-oriented rhetoric further complicates coalition-building. For these 
reasons, populists have excelled in opposition but struggled in government, which 
requires moderation and concessions (Heinisch, 2003).
Sometimes, however, an opportunity comes along where the populist gets a chance to 
move the ball far down the field. A crowning moment is thus when he/she has a breakout 
moment and accomplishes something transformative that would otherwise take much 
longer time, or perhaps even be impossible, had he/she not seized that opportunity. 
Populists tend to be “clever newsmakers” who get the media’s attention “via press con-
ferences, theatrical events, photo-opportunities, or by making inflammatory statements” 
(Mazzoleni, 2008: 55-56) to the extent that they may become “a political ‘pop star’ or 
‘media-icon’” (Mazzoleni, 2008: 56). To be sure, these skills will at times reinforce 
some of the shortcomings discussed above. For example, an outrageous statement in a 
TV interview may reinforce the public perception of a particular populist as divisive 
and unfit for high office. On the other hand, a populist could also use a highly publicised 
media appearance to improve both his/her public image and the image amongst fellow 
politicians by convincing them that he/she is a force to be reckoned with and even 
someone they can work with.
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Populists’ apparent ability to attract media attention begs the question of what inher-
ent qualities they possess that other politicians do not, or seemingly not to the same de-
gree. I suggest that certain aspects of populism are conducive to getting media attention. 
The preference for a strong leader is likely to attract candidates for such leadership who, 
to some degree, are “natural” leaders. Getting a following shows the populist’s ability 
to lead in the sense of taking action and inspiring others, and requires perceptiveness in 
terms of sensing what will trigger a response from others, and, probably, a predilection 
for personal attention. The perceptiveness appears to either extend to the media and 
their logic or lead to the realisation that he or she needs to learn how the media operate, 
because they can provide him or her with a megaphone. Combined with Manichean 
populist ideology/rhetoric, by which the populist casts him- or herself as a contrarian 
figure, all this should translate into an ability and willingness to say and do things that 
appeal to the media’s taste for conflict and drama, especially those media outlets that 
engage in populism themselves (see e.g. Esser et al., 2017). Moreover, personal charisma 
is a quality that, when added to the aforementioned ones, can help vault the populist 
leader to the forefront of national politics, even though it may not be decisive. I propose 
that these qualities explain populists’ “special ability to make headlines and appear on 
breaking news, depending on the particular mood of the country” (Mazzoleni, 2008: 56). 
Paradoxically, however, crowning moments can make populists less anti-establishment, 
since they turn the populists into leading actors within the system that they criticise. 
Understood this way, crowning moments are unique to populists.
What counts as transformative must be assessed on a case-by-case basis; the criterium 
must be that the populist is able to harness a confluence of factors in the political and 
media environments into making them work for him/her, thus enabling the populist to 
achieve one or multiple major policy, political and/or personal goal(s) in a way that 
transform(s) his/her status. In order to assess if a certain chain of events amounts to 
a crowning moment, the researcher therefore needs intimate knowledge of the case at 
hand. Not all populists will get such an opportunity or be able to recognise and exploit it. 
Moreover, some will achieve long-term success without having experienced a particular 
crowning moment. However, when a populist takes centre stage and manages to come 
out ahead in a high stakes political situation that is playing out under the media glare, it 
might be a crowning moment. Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of a crowning moment. 
In Figure 1, a political opportunity is any major event or political development to 
which political actors, in a given political system, must respond. Those involved perceive 
that something important is at stake and attempt to influence the ensuing process in order 
to protect or advance their own interests. Such an opportunity could for example be a 
brewing conflict within a party, an unexpected election result, the death or resignation 
of an important political leader or a government crisis.
A media opportunity denotes extraordinary media interest in an event or political de-
velopment, including possible consequences and the responses of the involved political 
actors. This could, for example, be continual coverage of a tragic accident that national 
politicians must tackle, and situations when the media and the political opposition seek 
to hold the government accountable. Depending on how political actors respond, both 
the political opportunity and media opportunity thus hold the potential to have important 
consequences. As one of the political actors at the centre of attention, or with the oppor-
tunity and ability to insert him- or herself into the situation, the populist leader weighs 
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the options and ultimately settles on the course of action that is believed to serve one 
or multiple major policy, political and/or personal goal(s) in a transformative way. If, 
for example, a major corruption scandal involving prominent politicians is unearthed, 
a populist may be able to craft a line of attack against the establishment that shapes the 
media narrative and resonates widely within the electorate. As a result, the populist may 
make a major electoral breakthrough, provide the impetus for significant policy reform 
or be seen as a serious contender for high office.
In the next section, the concept of a crowning moment is applied in the analysis of the 
events surrounding the 1987 no-confidence motion against the Norwegian government. 
The analysis shows how Hagen very skilfully used the situation to advance his party’s 
political interests and transform his personal image. 
The case of Carl I. Hagen and the 1987 no-confidence motion
The Progress Party was founded in 1973 by the 69-year old dog kennel owner Anders 
Lange in an Oslo movie theatre. “Anders Lange’s party for a strong reduction in taxes, 
fees, and public intervention”, renamed Fremskrittspartiet (The Progress Party) in 
1977, had many of the characteristics of populism: personalised leadership, an anti-
establishment attitude and a party programme emphasising what it was against. During 
Carl I. Hagen’s 28 years (1978-2006) at the helm of the party, a rather conventional, 
mass-party like party organisation was combined with de facto personalised leadership. 
While the party became less strident in its view of the state, it retained its populist view 
of representative democracy and espoused anti-immigrant views (Svåsand, 2002).3 It has 
also kept its slogan “For regular people” (For folk flest). As the face of the party, Hagen 
was often called the most media-savvy politician in the country, and his TV appear-
ances and rhetoric have been the focus of academic studies (Johansen, 2002; Kjeldsen, 
2002); notably, Erik Solheim, a former leader of the Socialist Left Party, has conceded 
that he copied Hagen’s style (Todal, 2003). It was Hagen’s manoeuvring in the 1987 
no-confidence motion against the government that earned Hagen the unofficial title of 
the most media-savvy politician in the country. 
 Political opportunity Media opportunity
Opportunity assessment  
and response by  
populist
Transformative  
attainment of major,  
policy, political and/or  
personal goal(s)
Figure 1. A theoretical model of a crowning moment
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The political and media opportunity
In the 1985 parliamentary election, the Progress Party, still a young party that was not 
yet institutionalised, won only two seats, down from four in the previous period.4 On 
the other hand, with the overall election result, the party now became the swing vote in 
the parliament, wielding significant blackmailing power in the Storting. It could choose 
to support either the centre-right coalition government of the Conservative Party, the 
Christian Democrats, and the Centre Party, or the Labour Party, Norway’s largest party 
and the only government alternative. In May of 1986, Hagen voted against the centre-
right coalition government in a vote of no confidence and a Labour Party government 
replaced it. 
In the spring of 1987, the Conservative Party was eager to get back into government 
and looking for an opportunity in parliament to force the Labour Party government to 
resign through a no-confidence motion together with its two former coalition partners. 
They agreed to do it over the government’s handling of the annual negotiations with the 
farmers’ unions, which led to 10,000 protesting farmers marching in Oslo (Rommetvedt, 
2014). Pressured by the agrarian Centre Party, the Conservative Party and the Christian 
Democrats agreed to increase the subventions to the farmers beyond what the govern-
ment had offered. However, they needed the Progress Party’s two votes and apparently 
assumed that Hagen would prefer a new centre-right government and support them, even 
though the Progress Party was known to favour a reduction in such subsidies. After all, 
Hagen had himself introduced unsuccessful no-confidence motions against the Labour 
Party government in May and October of 1986, and voted for another unsuccessful no-
confidence motion in May of 1987 (Iversen, 1998: 100; Moen, 2006: 157). 
In the post-war era, only two Norwegian governments (1963, 1986) had fallen af-
ter losing a confidence vote. Any confidence vote that stands a chance of succeeding 
is therefore a major political and media event. In 1987, the Norwegian Broadcasting 
Corporation (NBC) still enjoyed a TV monopoly.5 The radio monopoly fell in 1981, 
when the first local radio stations emerged (Sandnes & Tørdal, 2018), but the NBC was, 
in practice, still a monopoly broadcaster in 1987. By contrast, there were two major 
broadsheets and two major tabloids, in addition to numerous other national and regional 
newspapers. It was Hagen’s deliberate strategy to stoke up public interest in how he and 
the Progress Party would ultimately vote, and his strategic use of the NBC, that turned 
the affair into a media drama.
Carl I. Hagen’s assessment and response
When the Conservative Party, the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party announced 
their plan for a no-confidence vote over the agricultural negotiations, on which the Stort-
ing would vote on 12 June, Carl I. Hagen realised that he could capitalise on it in more 
than one way. His immediate thoughts about the critical importance of the media are in-
structive; he had learned from his failure to capitalise on the 1974 debate about women’s 
legal right to abortion right after he took over Anders Lange’s6 seat in the parliament: 
Again the attention would be on the Progress Party’s position on an important is-
sue, and we could use the situation to get publicity and to get our message out to 
the voters. I had had an equally good opportunity to promote the Progress Party 
on the abortion issue when I entered the Storting in 1974, but back then I was too 
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inexperienced. I blew the entire opportunity by going public with my position way 
too early. Back then I didn’t understand that the attention would have increased 
if I hadn’t revealed it until a few days later. I would not make that mistake this 
time. (Hagen, 2007: 124 [Author’s translation])
A week before the parliamentary vote, Hagen told his wife, who was his secretary: “We 
have to handle this so that the decision is made at the very last minute” (Iversen, 1998: 
100 [Author’s translation]). 
Hagen devised a two-pronged plan to accomplish his goal(s), and he would execute 
it in public. First, he had to win over public opinion by framing the matter in terms of 
preferential treatment of farmers in the midst of financial distress, when everyone else 
was expected to show restraint. His argument would be that the farmers also had to 
show moderation. The public debate could not be about picking a government. Hagen 
(2007: 125 [Author’s translation]) writes in his memoir that “I had to steer the debate 
through the media and the public sphere, so that people understood that this was what the 
issue was actually about, and not who was going to be prime minister in Norway”. He 
stayed on message in his media appearances in the days leading up to the parliament’s 
scheduled debate and vote on the matter. 
Second, by his own admission, he decided to slow down the entire process (Hagen, 
2007: 125), which he did by engaging the entire Progress Party apparatus and the 
prospective new prime minister, Conservative Party leader Rolf Presthus, in a public 
deliberation process. This served multiple purposes. To begin, the internal Progress Party 
deliberations looked like a textbook example of internal party democracy in action, in 
which the high command of the party sought input from and listened to its grass roots 
and activists about how the party should vote. Hagen would thus accrue internal and 
external democratic legitimacy. Put differently, it would make him and the party look 
good. Moreover, the internal process had the added benefit of reinforcing the activists’ 
personal loyalty to him, as they would feel that they had been listened to (Moen, 2006: 
159). Hagen therefore asked for statements from the party’s province leaders and local 
and provincial branches. The party’s parliamentary group held an open public hearing, 
where people living near Oslo were invited to attend the discussion, and the party’s na-
tional board was convened to give advice. He sent Presthus a public letter containing ten 
questions about what a change in government would mean policy-wise for the Progress 
Party, which was dubbed “Presthus’s 10 Exam Questions” by the media. Meanwhile, 
Presthus was kept in the dark about how Hagen would vote. Most dramatically, Hagen 
staged a TV event together with the leader of the Progress Party’s youth organisation, Tor 
Mikkel Wara. Live on NBC’s main evening newscast (Dagsrevyen), two days before the 
party would decide, Wara informed Hagen of the resolution passed by the youth party: 
if the proposal of the Conservative Party, the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party 
meant a wage increase for the farmers that was greater than the increase that others had 
got, the Progress Party should vote against a change in government (Hagen, 2007: 125-
126 [Author’s translation]). Hagen writes that the message “was communicated directly 
to the voters watching television at home, just like I wanted”. 
Hagen’s grand finale came on 11 June, the night before the Storting would vote, af-
ter having kept the media and political Norway in suspense for a week (Iversen, 1998; 
Moen, 2006; Rommetvedt, 2014; Hagen, 2007). Hagen announced a press conference at 
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19:30 in the Storting – the exact same time that the NBC’s main evening television news-
cast began. He figured that given the high stakes – the government could be thrown out 
by the parliament the next day – NBC would cover his press conference live. At 19:15, 
Hagen dropped by Presthus’s office and informed him of his decision, and proceeded to 
the room where he would hold the conference, where nearly 100 press journalists had 
gathered (Storsletten, 1987). As predicted, the NBC carried the event live, and agreed 
to let Hagen speak for three minutes before it could ask any questions.7 In prime time, 
with a TV audience of one million – one fourth of the population – and with Centre 
Party leader Johan J. Jacobsen standing by in the NBC’s Oslo studio, waiting to com-
ment on Hagen’s decision, Hagen looked straight into the camera and explained that 
for the sake of the national economy, he would vote against the no-confidence motion. 
There would be no change in government (Hagen, 2007; Iversen, 1998; Moen, 2006; 
Rommetvedt, 2014). 
Goal attainment
Hagen achieved both a major political and a major personal goal with his handling of the 
political and media opportunity that arose with the centre-right coalition’s no-confidence 
motion. Politically, his fledgling party earned some much-needed external credibility as a 
serious and responsible actor that was capable of acting in the national interest, not only 
in terms of policy, but also by contributing to government stability. Hagen’s decision a 
year earlier to vote against the centre-right coalition government over an increase in the 
gas tax, which led to its resignation, in spite of Hagen’s 1985 campaign promise to sup-
port the government, had created a public perception of him as an opportunistic populist. 
The vote over the subventions to the farmers was an opportunity to transform his image. 
In his memoir, Hagen (2007: 128 [Author’s translation]) states that “I’m proud that we 
managed to put national interest ahead of the narrow partisan interest”. To be sure, his 
ability to block an increase in the subventions to the farmers was a partisan interest, and 
in that sense he also won a significant policy victory. Moreover, the enormous publicity 
he received was to the benefit of the Progress Party. The quote above shows that these 
partisan considerations motivated Hagen. However, by doing what was widely seen as 
the fiscally most responsible thing by stressing the need for restraint and moderation, 
Hagen and his party looked responsible. That, of course, was also in his party’s inter-
est. But he could have voted for the government alternative that he clearly favoured, 
as evidenced by his vote for the recent no-confidence motions against the Labour Party 
government, and thus potentially have won considerable political concessions. Moreover, 
his no-vote exacerbated his already complicated relations with the centre-right parties, 
which in turn was unhelpful to his own chances of entering into a coalition government 
with them at some point. While Hagen’s machinations were opportunistic and self-
serving, he at least appeared willing and able to rise above hardball partisan politics at 
a critical moment for the country.
The entire episode also elevated Hagen personally as a major national political fig-
ure. He received widespread praise from both political opponents and the media for his 
handling of the matter, thus earning personal credibility, too. The ambitious Hagen, who 
wanted to grow and turn the Progress Party into a ruling party, showed himself to be a 
shrewd and savvy parliamentary tactician by making himself the most critical actor, and 
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in the eyes of some, a statesman. The tabloid Dagbladet described Hagen’s performance 
as “somewhat of a statesman’s act”, and the historian and prominent Socialist Left Party 
politician Trygve Bull even called him “the greatest statesman since Count Wedel”8 
(Moen, 2006: 163 [Author’s translation]). The prominent political science professor 
Jens A. Christophersen said that Hagen was the one “who has mobilised the national 
sense of responsibility” (Erlandsen, 1987 [Author’s translation]). According to Progress 
Party biographer Jan Martin Iversen (1998: 101 [Author’s translation]), Hagen had ap-
peared the way he wanted to: “Statesman-like, powerful, solemn, and responsible”. This 
observation is supported by Johansen (2002: 68), who much later argued that through 
the years, Hagen has embraced the role of the statesman in his TV appearances, noting 
that Hagen has often stared straight into the camera in the way that only the Norwegian 
king and the prime minister do when they give their televised New Year’s speech. 
Hagen was also crowned the country’s most media-savvy politician. Aftenposten, the 
leading national broadsheet, referred to Hagen’s “week-long political ‘show’” (Malmø, 
1987 [Author’s translation]). Norway’s largest newspaper, VG, devoted a full page to 
the TV performance itself, which it called “a sparkling performance that gets an A for 
execution and style”. Referring to him as “TV Hagen”, it called him “the country’s 
most media-aware politician”, and quoted NBC employees saying that “many politi-
cians have a lot to learn from Hagen when it comes to performing” (Storsletten, 1987 
[Author’s translation]). According to Iversen (1998: 101 [Author’s translation]), “the 
term ‘media politician’ got a new meaning”. Nearly three decades later, Hagen himself 
was no less effusive, stating that “I ruled the media for an entire week” (Rommetvedt, 
2014 [Author’s translation]). He conceded in his memoir that “I’ve kept many of them 
[newspaper clippings], and when I’ve felt down and frustrated, I’ve taken a look at them 
again. It cheers me up every time” (Hagen, 2007: 128 [Author’s translation]).
Conclusion
Two conclusions follow from this analysis. First, one of populist leaders’ most critical 
assets is their keen understanding of media logic. It enables them to recognise oppor-
tunities in their political and media environments, and to apply the appropriate means 
in pursuit of their goals. Consequently, it increases the likelihood of populist leaders 
having a crowning moment. Notably, their media-savviness can be used to transcend 
their populist image policy-wise, and the crowning moment can make populists appear 
less “anti-establishment”, in that it turns the populist into a leading actor within the 
system he/she criticises.
Second, a crowning moment can have a long-term impact. In Hagen’s case, it was 
followed by many political successes, including a breakthrough in the local elections 
later in 1987, and a national breakthrough in 1989. While successful mobilisation on the 
immigration issue in 1987 likely explains most of that success, it was Hagen’s handling 
of the no-confidence motion months earlier that broadened his image. It was here that 
Hagen discovered his winning formula: populist, yet responsible when necessary. The 
Progress Party has managed to become a governing party while retaining its populist 
appeal. 
Not all populists are equally media-savvy, and crowning moments can be cancelled 
out by future missteps. Moreover, crowning moments might be more elusive in a more 
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complex media landscape, particularly in the age of social media. Future research should 
study the presence or absence of crowning moments in other contexts, in particular the 
impact of social media on populists’ chances for a breakout moment.
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Notes
 1. Page 4 in the stand-alone copy of the chapter which the author received from Toril Aalberg, 10 April 
2018.
 2. Translation by Hjarvard (2018: 106).
 3. The Progress Party campaigned against immigration for the first time in the 1987 election, but Hagen 
has publicly expressed anti-Islam views since the late 1970s (Hagen, 1979).
 4. The party re-entered the parliament in 1981, after losing the four seats it won in 1973 and 1977.
 5. The monopoly lasted until 1992.
 6. Lange died in 1974.
 7. Hagen and NBC later disagreed about how explicit their agreement that he would talk first had been 
(Bratholm, 2008). NBC argued that they had just agreed that he would be interviewed at the beginning 
of the newscast. 
 8. Count Herman Wedel Jarlsberg was a leading Norwegian politician in the 1800s, who served as the 
president of the parliament and the first Norwegian governor of the Norwegian–Swedish union (1814-
1905) (Britannica, 2018).
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